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T
he volatility of financial markets in recent
years has led to increased concern. As trad-
ing of financial assets on organized ex-
changes and over-the-counter markets has grown,
events such as the 1987 stock market crash and the
1992 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in Europe
have raised fundamental questions about the role
these markets play in the economy. In particular,
there is concern that much of the increased trading
of financial assets is of a short-term, speculative
nature that adds little value to the intermediation
process and in the extreme case may distort the
efficient functioning of financial markets.
This view has led some economists to advo-
cate a securities transaction tax (STT). Such a tax,
it is argued, when applied to a broad range of
financial transactions, would raise the cost of
short-term speculative trading, reduce financial
market volatility, and improve the efficiency of
financial markets. This type of tax might also raise
substantial revenue that could help reduce the
federal budget deficit. The revenue potential has
not gone unnoticed in Washington, where recent
budget proposals by both the Bush and Clinton
administrations have included an STT.
The proposal of an STT, however, is highly
controversial. Opponents doubt that an STT would
reduce financial market volatility. According to
these analysts, throwing even a little sand in the
gears of financial markets is not benign—it would
damage the markets by reducing liquidity and rais-
ing the cost of capital for U.S. business. Oppo-
nents also doubt an STT would yield substantial
revenue gains because investors could avoid the tax
by shifting to tax-exempt activities or moving trans-
actions outside U.S. markets.
This article explores the pros and cons of a
securities transaction tax. The article first presents a
brief introduction to securities transaction taxes. The
article next presents the case for introducing a
small securities transaction tax which rests on the
assumption of large potential benefits from the
tax. The article then presents the case against a
securities transaction tax, including the prospec-
tive costs incurred by imposing the tax. The article
concludes that the proponents have overstated the
likely benefits of a securities transaction tax and
underestimated the potential costs.
INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES
TRANSACTION TAXES
A securities transaction tax is levied on the
sale of securities, such as stocks, bonds, options,
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article.or futures. The tax is paid each time a security is
sold. As such, a number of operational issues are
involved including which security transactions are
taxed and at what rate. 
Economists advocating an STT tend to favor
a broad-based tax. A broad-based tax would apply
to all marketable securities—stocks, bonds, op-
tions, futures, and other financial derivatives.
Such a tax was considered, but not adopted, in the
negotiations on the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1990. Over the years, a number of
prominent economists, including John Maynard
Keynes, Lawrence Summers (now Undersecre-
tary of the Treasury), and Joseph Stiglitz (now a
member of the President’s Council of Economic
Advisers) have supported a broad-based STT. 
More narrow taxes have been proposed in
Congress and by the Bush and Clinton administra-
tions. The narrow taxes could, for example, be
levied only on trading in derivative markets. Con-
gress, the Bush Administration, and the Clinton Ad-
ministration have considered taxes on futures trading
or options on futures trading. More specifically,
various Bush Administration budgets included
fees on futures trading: an 11 cent fee (in 1991), a
13 cent fee (in 1992), and a 15 cent fee (in 1993).
The Clinton Administration proposed a fee of 14
cents on futures and options on futures (1994).
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Another kind of narrow transaction tax has
been proposed by Eichengreen and Wyplosz.
They recommend an implicit tax on foreign
exchange transactions to reduce the likelihood of
speculative attacks against European Monetary
System (EMS) currencies. The tax is implicit because
it would require financial institutions that purchase
foreign exchange to make a non-interest bearing
deposit with the central bank. If financial institutions
are forced to make a deposit equal to 0.1 percent of
the transaction and the interest rate is 10 percent,
then the tax would be 1 percent of the transaction.
As interest rates rise, so would the tax rate.
While the idea of an STT is somewhat novel in
the United States, many industrial countries already
have some form of a securities tax. Table 1 shows
the wide range of securities taxed by different
countries and the wide range of tax rates. Transaction
tax rates differ according to the type of financial
instruments affected (equities are typically taxed
at a higher rate than derivatives), the location of
trade (on or off an exchange, at home or abroad),
and the identity of the buyer or seller (domestic or
foreign resident, market-maker or general trader).
To focus on the economic arguments that sup-
port an STT, this article considers a broad-based
0.5 percent tax applied to the sale of stocks, bonds
and other debt instruments, options, futures, and
other financial securities. Since most countries
and proposals exempt government securities, this
article assumes that Treasury securities are exempt.
And while the tax could be applied to the sale of
new issues, the analysis in this article applies the
tax only to transactions in secondary markets. 
An STT of 0.5 percent would increase trans-
action costs considerably, as an example from the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) makes clear.
Commission  fees for large institutions on the
NYSE are about $0.13 per share, and the average
bid/asked spread is about $0.25 per share (Hub-
bard, p. 997). Therefore, transaction costs are
about $0.38 per share in the absence of taxes.
Applying a 0.5 percent tax to an average share
price of $34.10 would increase transaction costs
$0.17 per share to about $0.55, a 50 percent
increase in transaction taxes.
THE CASE FOR AN STT
Proponents argue that an STT would provide
three important benefits. An STT would (1) reduce
excessive financial market volatility, (2) reduce the
amount of wasted resources in financial markets, and
(3) substantially increase government revenue.
Reduce excess volatility
Most advocates believe that financial markets
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Australia .30 Transaction tax
Austria .15 Transfer tax May be avoided ex country
.06 Arrangement fee May be avoided ex country
.04-.09 Courtage fee May be avoided ex country
Belgium .03 Stock market fee May be avoided ex country
.17 Stamp tax on buys and sells May be avoided ex country
Canada No taxes
Denmark No taxes for nonresidents
Finland No taxes
France No taxes for foreign investors
Germany .06 Courtage tax (official broker fee) May be avoided by trading
off the exchange
Greece .30 Transfer tax For registered shares only
Ireland 1.00 Stamp duty on purchases
Italy No taxes
Japan .30 Tokyo stock exchange sales tax May be avoided ex country
Netherlands No taxes
New Zealand No taxes
Norway No taxes
Portugal .04 Stock exchange levy
.05 OTC levy
Spain .15 Clearing Stock exchange fees
Sweden No taxes
Switzerland .075 Stamp tax May be avoided ex country
.010 State tax May be avoided ex country
.005 Exchange fee May be avoided ex country
Turkey No taxes
United Kingdom .50 Stamp duty Assessed on purchases only
(£2) PTM levy Assessed on trades above
£10,000
United States ($.01) SEC fee Assessed on sales per $300 
of value
Note: Data for Iceland, Luxembourg, and Yugoslavia were not available.
Source: Union Bank of Switzerland, UBS Global Research, Guide to Global Equity Markets, 4th ed., January 1994.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 19are too volatile. By raising the cost of trading, an
STT would reduce short-term trading, which is
thought to be a principal cause of excess volatility.
The expectation is that prices would better reflect
fundamental values and that the cost of capital
would fall.
Since the STT is paid each time a security is
sold, it would have a greater effect on short-term
trading than long-term trading. Consider the
effect of a 0.5 percent tax on an investment yield-
ing a 4.0 percent return (see appendix for details
on calculations). In this example, the tax on one-
day trading is 282.7 percentage points, while the
tax on five-year trading is only 0.1 percentage
points. The key is that the tax must be paid whether
the security is held for one day or five years. For
a one-day trade, a 0.5 percent tax becomes an
annualized cost of 282.7 percent. For a five-year
trade, a 0.5 percent tax is a 0.1 percent tax per year.
Since the tax is higher on short-term trading strate-
gies than long-term trading strategies, short-term
trading would be discouraged more than long-
term trading. With short-term trading reduced, the
average holding period would increase.
Before discussing why an STT might reduce
excess financial market volatility, it is important to
understand why volatility may arise. Volatility has
two components—fundamental volatility and excess
volatility. Fundamental volatility reflects the fact
that security prices change when the fundamental
value of the security changes. In contrast, excess
volatility occurs when security prices change for
reasons unrelated to the fundamental value.
Fundamental volatility is part of a well func-
tioning financial market. When the fundamental
value of a security changes—such as when the
expected future stream of income changes—the
price of the security also changes. But new infor-
mation about future income streams can be vola-
tile. As a result, the volatility of expected future
income streams can cause considerable volatility
of prices. Such changes are called fundamental
volatility.
The economy benefits from prices reflecting
fundamental values because investment funds go
to their most valuable uses. Companies with good
investment opportunities have high fundamental
values, while companies with poor investment
opportunities have low fundamental values. There-
fore, if prices reflect fundamental values, compa-
nies with good investment opportunities will be
able to sell their stock at a high price, allowing
them to raise funds at lower expense than compa-
nies with poor investment opportunities.
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Many analysts believe that financial market
volatility can also be excessive (Summers and
Summers; Stiglitz). As evidence of excess volatil-
ity, analysts point to October 1987. It is hard to
identify any fundamental changes that occurred then
to justify a 22 percent crash in the stock market.
As further evidence, analysts recall a 1981 study
by Shiller, who found that stock prices were more
volatile than would be predicted by the actual
volatility of dividends.
The condition of excess volatility is said to
reflect “irrational” investor behavior. Irrational
behavior reflects waves of optimism or pessimism,
or in Keynes’ words, “animal spirits” possessed by
traders. Economists now use the term “noise
trader” to describe investors who exhibit such
waves of optimism or pessimism. The distinguish-
ing feature of noise traders is that they buy and sell
securities based on something other than funda-
mentals. Since these animal spirits come and go,
seemingly at random, stock prices are more volatile
than if they reflected only economic fundamentals.
The proponent’s view of an STT is that it
reduces excess volatility by reducing short-term
trading. According to this view, noise traders are
primarily short-term traders. Therefore, by reducing
short-term trading, an STT would reduce noise
trading—the primary cause of excess volatility.
Reducing excess volatility could have two
benefits. First, less excess volatility could spur
investment spending. With less volatility and
therefore less risk, the cost of capital would be
lower because the risk premium on an investment
would fall. A lower cost of capital would make it
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investment spending to rise.
Reduced volatility could also lead to a more
efficient allocation of existing investment spend-
ing. With excess volatility, prices can move away
from their fundamental value. For example, if
traders are bearish, they may sell stocks because
they think the price is going to fall, even if the
fundamental value has not changed. To the extent
that an STT drives noise traders out of the market,
prices would more closely track fundamental val-
ues. As result, not only would investment spend-
ing rise, but the existing spending would be
allocated more efficiently.
Reduce wasted resources 
A second potential benefit of an STT is that
fewer resources would be wasted on financial
markets. Tobin, Summers and Summers, and
Stiglitz believe that too many resources are spent
on trading paper assets rather than on creating
wealth. For example, James Tobin, the winner of
the 1981 Nobel Prize in economics, wrote: 
What is clear is that very little of the work of the
securities industry, as gauged by the volume of
market activity, has to do with the financing of real
investment in any very direct way. Likewise, those
markets have very little to do, in aggregate, with
the translation of the saving of households into
corporate investment (1984, p. 11).
Undeniably, the cost of operating our financial
markets is high.  Summers and Summers (p. 27)
estimate that the cost of operating our securities
markets was over $75 billion in 1987, or one-
fourth of total corporate profits and close to half
of corporate net investment.
But is the cost of operating our financial mar-
kets too high? A purpose of financial markets is to
channel household saving into creating wealth—
building new factories and making people health-
ier. If too many of the people who work in
financial markets are short-term speculators,
rather than creators of wealth, they simply are
acting to reallocate claims to wealth. Moreover,
financial institutions spend considerable time and
money creating and trading new and exotic finan-
cial instruments, such as financial derivatives.
While derivatives allow financial institutions and
speculators to earn lots of money, some analysts
do not believe derivatives create wealth. Accord-
ing to this view, short-term speculation is a waste,
and many of the new and exotic financial instru-
ments are overkill.
As a clarifying example, suppose a speculator
learns—before anyone else—that a pharmaceuti-
cal company plans to announce a cure for diabetes.
By buying shares of the pharmaceutical company
now, and selling the shares after the public an-
nouncement is made, the speculator can make a
great deal of money. The result of the trade is that
ownership of the pharmaceutical company has
changed, but no wealth has been created. Propo-
nents of an STT believe much of the $75 billion
currently used to operate financial markets is not
used to create wealth, but rather simply reallo-
cates claims to existing wealth resulting in a
waste of resources.
Increase government revenue
A third potential benefit of an STT is the
revenue it might raise. Without knowing the pre-
cise form of the tax, estimating the amount of
revenue collected is difficult. The Congressional
Budget Office, however, has estimated that a
broad-based 0.5 percent STT would raise $57.7
billion in the first five years. An alternative esti-
mate can be obtained by looking at the amount of
revenue raised in other countries. While the taxes
differ among countries, revenues raised in 1985
ranged from 0.04 percent of GNP in Germany to
0.48 percent of GNP in Switzerland. Applying
these percentages to the United States implies that
an STT could raise between $2.6 billion and $30.6
billion in 1993.
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Opponents of an STT argue that (1) the bene-
fits of an STT are overestimated, (2) an STT would
have harmful side effects, and (3) the tax is likely
to be ineffective. 
Overestimated benefits
The case for an STT rests on the assumption
that prices are excessively volatile—that prices
deviate from fundamental values. Opponents of an
STT are not convinced that financial markets are
excessively volatile. Moreover, even if markets
are excessively volatile, opponents doubt that an
STT would reduce excess volatility. Opponents fur-
ther doubt that an STT would save resources
currently wasted in financial markets.
STT and excess volatility. Deciding whether
volatility is excessive is complicated by the diffi-
culty of determining the fundamental value of a
security. Fundamental value is inherently unobserv-
able. Financial analysts may be able to estimate
what they call a fundamental value, but it is obvi-
ously an estimate with a margin of error. But
without  such knowledge, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether prices are excessively volatile.
There may be ways, however, to examine
volatility without knowing the fundamental value
of a security. For example, many people believe
excess volatility increased with the introduction
of financial derivatives. If true, and if fundamental
volatility did not change with the introduction of
derivatives, then measured volatility should
have increased in the 1980s as derivatives be-
came more prevalent. 
The evidence on whether volatility increased
in the 1980s is mixed. Schwert (p. 23) found that
volatility on broad portfolios of New York Stock
Exchange common stocks was not unusually high
in the 1980s, except during brief episodes such as
the October 1987 crash.
3 Therefore, if derivatives
caused excess volatility to increase, the data do not
obviously support the argument.
But even if excess volatility is a problem, an
STT may not be the solution. Neither economic
theory nor empirical evidence strongly supports
the idea that transaction taxes would reduce excess
volatility.
Economic theory suggests that transaction
taxes could either increase or decrease excess
volatility. For example, assume there are two
kinds of traders—informed traders and noise trad-
ers. Informed traders assess the fundamental value
of a security, then buy when the price is low and
sell when the price is high. By increasing the cost
of trading, an STT reduces the amounts of both
noise trading and informed trading. The effect on
excess volatility then depends on which group of
traders is hit harder. If the tax reduces the amount
of noise trading more than informed trading, ex-
cess volatility would fall. However, if the tax
reduces  informed trading more than noise trading,
excess volatility could rise. 
Since economic theory is silent on whether an
STT would reduce excess volatility, perhaps em-
pirical evidence can shed light on the issue. Oppo-
nents believe empirical evidence contradicts the idea
that an STT would reduce excess volatility.
Security transaction taxes do not appear to
have alleviated the worldwide stock market crash
of October 1987. While most industrialized coun-
tries have an STT, all countries experienced a
stock market crash. Moreover, the evidence does
not suggest that countries with an STT experi-
enced a less severe crash. Chart 1 shows the rela-
tionship between the tax rate and the average daily
percentage change in stock prices in 23 countries
for the period one week before the beginning of
the crash on October 19 to two weeks afterward.
The average percentage decline in U.S. stock
prices, -1.4 percent, is indicated by the horizontal
line on the chart. Of the 19 countries with an STT,
12 (63 percent) had greater declines and seven (37
percent) had smaller declines than the United
States. In addition, there does not appear to be a
significant relationship between the decline and
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rate and average decline is 0.03, which is insig-
nificantly different from zero.
4
In a 1989 study of 23 industrial countries,
Roll found no evidence relating stock price
volatility to stock market price limits, margin
requirements, and transaction taxes. Roll studied
the periods January 2, 1987, to October 9, 1987,
and November 2, 1987, to March 31, 1989. Find-
ing that transaction taxes are inversely but insig-
nificantly correlated with volatility across
countries, he concluded: “The effect is too ques-
tionable for taxes to be used with confidence as an
effective policy instrument” (p. 241).
In a 1993 study of the Swedish experience
with STTs, Umlauf surprisingly found that “all else
being equal, taxes increase volatility” (p. 228).
5
Thus, the weight of empirical evidence casts doubt
on the claim that an STT would reduce excess
volatility.
STT and wasted resources. Opponents of an
STT believe that neither speculation nor the crea-
tion and trading of financial derivatives are waste-
ful—indeed, both provide many benefits to
society. While derivatives may not directly create
wealth, they meet investor needs by reducing risk
(Becketti). Moreover, derivatives allow firms to
operate internationally without exposing them-
selves to undue risk from exchange rate changes.
Therefore, it is not surprising that these new




Note:  The vertical axis is the percent change in stock prices for the period one week before the October 1987 stock crash to
two weeks after the crash.  The horizontal line is the average percentage decline in U.S. stock prices.






















ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1994 23instruments are valued highly. Furthermore, there
is little evidence that on balance too many re-
sources are devoted to creating and trading financial
derivatives.
Moreover, say opponents, the STT advocates
have only asserted the benefits of derivatives do
not justify the cost—they have not proven their
assertion. It would be helpful if the proponents
could point to specifics rather than to generali-
ties. The presumption in market economies is that
if a firm is willing to pay for a product—such as
an exotic derivative to hedge its foreign exchange
risk—then the product is worth the amount the
firm is willing to pay. Kiefer, in writing for the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress, gave shape to this idea:
 Such a standard would be inherently judgmental.
... If some measure other than value determined in
the market is to be used as the measure of “social
value,” then it is not clear what that measure is.
Such an approach would have broad implications
and could result in labeling many activities as
economically wasteful. Does the “social value” of
theme parks equal their cost, for example? What
about luxury homes and automobiles? First-class
airline and hotel accommodations? Pet rocks? (p.
CRS-24).
Harmful side effects
In the eyes of opponents, not only are the STT
benefits overestimated, but an STT would have
harmful side effects. For example, an STT would
penalize all investors, not just short-term traders,
noise traders, or speculators. In addition, the cost
of capital could actually rise, reducing investment—
the opposite of the effect claimed by advocates.
STT penalizes all investors. Even though an
STT is a tax on rapid turnover, all investors would
indirectly feel its effects. An STT increases the
bid/asked spread. That is, all traders—not just short-
term traders—pay more each time they trade. In
addition, although most households are not short-
term traders, the mutual funds that people use as
a vehicle for saving would be adversely affected
by an STT. Furthermore, since stock prices are
likely to fall following the adoption of an STT,
everyone who owns stocks would feel its effects.
All investors would be penalized by an STT
because all must pay the bid/asked spread. Dealers
profit by selling securities at a higher price than
they bought them. The price a dealer is willing to
pay is called the “bid” price, and the price a dealer
is willing to accept is called the “asked” price.
Therefore, by setting the asked price greater than
the bid price, a dealer makes money. If an investor
buys and immediately sells a security, he has to
pay the difference, or spread, between the bid and
asked price.
Since an STT increases the operating and
hedging costs of dealers, an STT would increase
the bid/asked spread paid by all investors. By
increasing the bid/asked spread when their costs
rise, dealers can continue to operate and cover
their costs. The bid/asked spread depends on the
number of trades over which dealers can spread
their fixed costs, such as a seat on the New York
Stock Exchange. But since an STT would reduce
the volume of trading, dealers would have fewer
trades over which to allocate their fixed costs;
thus, the bid/asked spread would rise. The
bid/asked spread also depends on the cost of hedg-
ing risk. Dealers hold an inventory of securities
which are vulnerable to price changes. Dealers
manage their risky inventory positions by using
derivatives such as futures and options (Schwert
and Seguin, p. 32). If the STT is imposed on futures
and options, then the cost of managing a dealer’s
risky inventory would rise, causing the bid/asked
spread to rise. 
An STT would also penalize anyone who
owns shares in a mutual fund. Approximately 27
percent of U.S. households in 1992 held shares in
mutual funds.
6 The average mutual fund share-
holder is 46 years old and earns $50,000 per year.
While individuals seldom make trades them-
selves, their mutual funds trade frequently. For
example, the average holding period for their
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Municipal Bond fund to 4.8 years for the Vanguard
Windsor fund (Lo and Heaton, p. 10). Since the
tax is paid each time a security turns over, an STT
could significantly reduce returns from investing
in mutual funds. 
Another way that everyone would pay an STT
is that stock prices would fall after an STT is
imposed. Hubbard (p. 23) estimated that a 0.5
percent STT on stock prices would cause them to
decline 2.3 to 5 percent. The reason for such a
decline is that the price of a security depends on
the current and future stream of income. If an
investor chooses to sell the security at a later date,
he must take into account the tax he must pay when
selling the security. Furthermore, the price at
which he can sell the stock will be reduced because
the next investor will also take into account the tax
she must pay when selling the security. Each in-
vestor must take into account the tax paid on all
future sales.
7 Since the average holding period on
the New York Stock Exchange is two years, an STT
would have to be paid every other year.
8
In Sweden, stock prices fell following the
announcement of an STT. Umlauf (p. 231) reported
that stock prices fell 2.2 percent on October 24,
1993, the day the initial tax was announced, and
fell an additional 0.8 percent on March 11, 1986,
the day an increase in the tax rate was announced.
These declines probably reflect only part of the
full effect of the tax, since the tax was anticipated.
During the month before the official announce-
ment of the tax, stock prices fell 5.3 percent.
STT and the cost of capital. Another harmful
side effect of an STT would be an increase in the
cost of capital. With falling stock prices, it would
be more costly for firms to raise capital through
issuing stock. Under reasonable assumptions, an
STT could raise the cost of equity capital by as
much as 70 basis points.
9
Such an increase in the cost of capital would
reduce the amount of business fixed investment.
McCauley and Zimmer reported that in 1988 the
cost of capital for equipment and machinery with
a life of 20 years was 11.2 percent for the United
States, 7.2 percent for Japan, 7.0 percent for Ger-
many, and 9.2 percent for the United Kingdom. An
increase in the cost of capital would make it more
expensive to raise funds in the stock market. As a
result, there would be fewer investment projects
that could justify such a high cost of capital,
ultimately lowering productivity and living standards.
Ineffective tax
The final argument against imposing a tax on
securities transactions is that such a tax would likely
be ineffective. The tax could be avoided and would
be difficult to administer. As a result, its effects on
raising revenue are probably overestimated.
Avoiding STT. According to opponents, an
STT would be easy to avoid. In designing tax
policy, it is important to remember that investors
will always try to avoid taxes. Judge Learned
Hand, writing in 1934, put it this way:
 Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Trea-
sury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase
one’s taxes.
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By advocating a broad-based tax, proponents
of an STT have attempted to meet the first rule of
tax policy: tax products that have few substitutes.
When a good is taxed, there is an incentive to buy
close substitutes that are not taxed. For example,
a tax on navel oranges would not be good tax
policy because it could be avoided by switching to
juice oranges, orange juice, or apples. It is for this
reason that a broad-based tax is generally pre-
ferred to a narrow tax.
However, individuals could avoid even a broad-
based STT by changing what and where they
trade. Investors could change what they trade by
switching, to the extent possible, from securities
that are taxed to securities that are not taxed. They
could also switch from securities that are highly
taxed to those that are lightly taxed. Furthermore,
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securities that are exempt from the STT. Given that
the tax would be a large share of the transaction
costs of participating in financial markets, there
would be an incentive to introduce securities that
are not taxable.
Avoidance of such a tax is not just a theoretical
possibility, it has happened before. Many past
financial innovations appear to be the market’s
response to government regulations. For example,
Hester studied seven major innovations in the
1960s and 1970s, and concluded that “the innova-
tions reduced distortions that arose from interest
rate ceilings, reserve requirements, and other
regulations” (p. 167). Rowe argued that much of
the growth in the commercial paper market in the
1960s and 1970s was due to Regulation Q ceilings
on interest rates. Finally, in discussing the incen-
tives for development of the Eurodollar market,
Goodfriend noted that banks could avoid regula-
tions by using the Eurodollar market.
Not only might investors change what they
trade, they might also change where they trade.
Small investors may find it difficult to move to
foreign markets, but large institutional investors
can easily make that move. It is even easier for
foreign investors to move to foreign markets.
Again, the Swedish experience is instructive.
Their tax was 1 percent beginning in 1984 and
2 percent beginning on July 1, 1986. Following
the tax hike, 30 percent of the trading volume of
Swedish stocks moved to London. By 1990, 50
percent of the trading of Swedish stocks had
moved to London (Umlauf, pp. 229-230). In ad-
dition, the Swedish market for interest rate options
disappeared following the imposition of an STT.
In the United States it would be easy to escape
the tax by trading U.S. securities in London, where
large amounts of U.S. stocks are already traded.
To counteract this response, the tax could be im-
posed on U.S. investors who trade U.S. securities
in other countries. However, investors might
then choose to invest in foreign securities that are
close substitutes for U.S. securities. Moreover,
foreign markets could create synthetic securities
that mimic the S&P 500 or other U.S. securities.
For similar reasons, taxing futures transac-
tions could put the U.S. futures market at a
significant disadvantage. Edwards (p. 83) esti-
mated that a 0.5 percent tax applied to the
notional value of a stock index futures contract
would increase transaction costs for a round-trip
trade in the futures market by 2,200 percent. By
increasing transaction costs so much, many
investors might switch to foreign futures markets.
And since futures markets throughout the world
are characterized by low transaction costs, the
incentive to switch to foreign markets could be
great. Moreover, this is not an idle concern, as U.S.
futures markets compete head-to-head with
foreign futures markets. For example, eight of
the top ten U.S. futures contracts are also traded
on foreign markets (Edwards, pp. 85-86). And
these eight contracts are large. According to
Edwards, if half of the annual trading in those
eight  futures contracts moved to foreign markets,
the volume on U.S. futures markets would de-
cline by one-third.
Overestimating revenue. An STT would un-
questionably raise some revenue, but the amount
might be less than expected. The overestimates arise
because the tax base would decline as security prices
and the volume of trading decline. Trading volume
would decline for three reasons: a tax induces
investors to trade less often, some trading would
move abroad, and new securities not subject to the
tax would be introduced. Hubbard (p. 989) con-
servatively estimated that an STT on stock trans-
actions could reduce trading volume by 25
percent. Furthermore, an STT on futures transac-
tions could reduce trading volume by 88 percent
(Hubbard, p. 992). In Sweden, the Finance Minis-
try initially estimated revenues at 1,500 million
Swedish kronor (SEK) per year. In contrast, the
realized revenue averaged only SEK 50 million
per year, with a maximum of SEK 80 million in
1989 (Froot and Campbell, p. 18). 
STT opponents also point out other significant
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administering, and ensuring compliance could be
significant. In addition, the cost spent to avoid the
tax must be taken into account. Lawyers and fi-
nancial analysts would devote considerable time
and energy to designing new securities to avoid
the tax. Since this is solely a result of the tax, it
should be considered another cost of the tax.
Given the salaries of lawyers and financial ana-
lysts, this cost could also be significant. After
taking account of these costs and the likely avoid-
ance, the net revenue gained from an STT might
fall far short of the $58 billion estimated by the
Congressional Budget Office.
CONCLUSIONS
The case for an STT has not been proven. The
benefits of the tax do not necessarily exceed the
cost. While the proponents have identified several
possible benefits, serious questions remain about
whether the benefits would be achieved. As Rich-
ard Darman, the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget during the Bush Administration,
stated: “[An STT] has no evident justification. It
could cause distortions in the financial markets
and could cause many investors, particularly insti-
tutions, to shift their equity trading away from
organized exchanges and to foreign countries”
(Grundfest and Shoven, p. 441).
An STT will not necessarily reduce volatility.
Advocates argue an STT would reduce volatility
by eliminating noise trading, which adds volatility
to the market. Opponents argue an STT could just
as easily raise volatility. Opponents also point to
the Swedish experience and to econometric evi-
dence, both of which show little effect of an STT
on volatility.
There is no clear evidence that too many
resources are wasted on financial analysis. Advo-
cates claim that too many resources are spent on
trading claims to financial assets, rather than on
creating wealth. Opponents, on the other hand,
believe that by creating and trading financial de-
rivatives, financial markets provide important
benefits to society.
While an STT would raise needed revenues,
the revenue gains may be overestimated. Advocates
argue that even if an STT had no benefits, the tax
could be useful because the $58 billion it might
raise in the first five years could be used to reduce
the government’s large budget deficit. However,
opponents point out that since investors will try to
avoid the tax, the revenue gains could be substan-
tially less than what proponents estimate.
In addition to disputing the benefits of an STT,
opponents believe that the tax has several harmful
side effects. It would penalize all investors—not
just short-term traders, noise traders, or financial
analysts. Furthermore, the cost of capital would
likely rise, reducing the amount of investment.
Furthermore, if the tax is such a good idea,
why are many countries reducing or eliminating
their taxes? Sweden, Finland, and Taiwan have
recently reduced or eliminated their taxes, while
Australia, Japan, and the U.K. are considering
reductions in their taxes (Froot and Campbell, p. 1).
Finally, London is one of the biggest backers
of a U.S. transaction tax. The London financial
press believes that a U.S. tax would be good for
business in London. In a story about a U.S. STT,
a London Financial Times headline read “City
Sees Advantages in U.S. Levy on Volume.”  The
story goes on to say that “if the U.S. administration
decides to go ahead with a securities turnover tax,
it will have strong support in the City of London”
Grundfest, p. A10).  Obviously, London believes
that it will get some additional business if the
United States adopts an STT.
Given the doubts and uncertainties, the burden
of proof for adopting an STT remains with the
advocates. As yet, the case for an STT has not been
proven.
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THE RELATION BETWEEN HOLDING PERIOD AND RETURN
In all examples, assume a $100 invest-
ment, no inflation, and that investors demand
a real after-tax rate of return of 4 percent.
No taxes.
With a 4 percent real rate of return, a $100
investment yields $104.
A 0.5 percent tax and one-day 
holding period. 
An interest rate of 286.71 percent (at an
annual rate) yields a 4 percent after-tax rate
of return. A 286.71 percent annual return
equals a 0.5176 percent return over one week.
A $100 investment yields $100.5176 in
one week (= $100 * 1.005176). The tax is
$0.50259 (= 0.005*$100.5176), so the after-
tax return is $100.015. Therefore, the annual-
ized after-tax rate of return is 4 percent
(= [($100.015/$100)262 - 1] * 100 = 4 percent).
A 0.5 percent tax and a five-year 
holding period. 
An interest rate of 4.1 percent yields a 4
percent after-tax rate of return. A 4.1 percent
annual return yields $122.28 after 5 years.
The tax is $0.61 (= 0.005*$122.28), so the
after-tax return in $121.67. Therefore, the
average annual after-tax rate of return is 4.0
percent (= [($121.67/$100)(1/5) - 1] * 100 = 4
percent).
A general formula. 
The general formula is now easy to state.
Let i be the interest rate, expressed at an annual
rate, and let t  be the tax rate. Let h be the
holding period, defined so that h = 52 means a
one-week holding period and h = 0.2 means a
five-year holding period. Then, assuming a 4
percent after-tax rate of return is required, the
following arbitrage condition must hold:
[(1 +  i) (1 -  t ) h  - 1] = .04 .






(1 - t) h
  -  1 ù
ú
û
  ´ 100 .
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1 Hubbard gives a brief discussion of the history of secu-
rities transaction taxes in the United States.
2 Engel and Morris discuss the benefits and characteristics
of efficient markets.
3 In addition, Becketti and Sellon show that normal vola-
tility in the stock market has been relatively constant from
1920 to 1988. In contrast to normal volatility, the fre-
quency of large one-day price changes was much higher
in 1985-87 than in previous periods. They also show that
interest rate volatility increased in the early 1980s. Vola-
tility of short-term rates has since declined, but volatility
of long-term rates has remained high. 
4 The rank correlation statistic is Fisher’s exact test. A
typical correlation coefficient measures the association
between the value of the tax rate and average price change.
The rank correlation coefficient measures the association
between the rank of the tax rate and the rank of the average
price change. The p-value is 0.85.
5 However, the results are not unambiguous. For example,
the ratio of weekly to daily volatility declines, suggesting
that taxes may reduce the effect of traders that simply
follow trends in the stock market.
6 All figures come from the Mutual Fund Fact Book.
7 Thus, there are two opposing forces on stock prices. The
direct effect of the tax is to make stock prices fall. However,
if volatility falls, the fall in risk would make stock prices
rise, offsetting the fall in prices. Which effect dominates?
If volatility is unaffected, the direct effect dominates and
prices fall. If volatility falls, the direct and indirect effects
offset each other and prices could rise or fall. However,
evidence cited earlier suggests that the relation between
volatility and transaction taxes is weak, at best. Therefore,
the direct effect is likely to dominate and so prices are
likely to fall.
8 While not everyone holds stocks, many do. Based on the
1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, Heaton and Lo
(Table 13) report that 15 percent of households earning
less than $30,000 held stock, 46 percent of households
earning between $30,000 and $100,000 held stock, and
almost 80 percent of households earning more than
$100,000 held stock. 
9 The price-earnings ratio is approximately 11.7, implying
a required role of return of 8.55 percent. Assuming the
corporate tax rate is about 36 percent, the cost of capital
is 13.36 percent. If prices fell 5 percent, the price-earnings
ratio would fall to 11.15, the required rate of return would
rise to 9 percent, and the cost of capital would rise to 14.06
percent. Therefore, the cost of capital rises from 13.36
percent to 14.06 percent, an increase of 70 basis points.
10 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934),
Aff d. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), as quoted in Grundfest and
Shoven, p. 423.
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